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CHAPTER

NINE

PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT
TO ONE'S IMAGE
A Cultural and Legal History

Samantha Barbas

After receiving calls from her neighbors, a woman found that her
daughter's picture had been used in an ad for a local ice cream store,
without the daughter's or the mother's consent. Her daughter had simply "liked" the ice cream store on Facebook. The woman was outraged
and embarrassed. People across the country whose photographs had
been similarly exploited under Facebook's Sponsored Stories advertising program sued Facebook (Henn 2013 ).
In 1948, the Saturday Evening Post ran a critique of cab drivers
in Washington, DC that accused them of cheating their customers.
A photograph appeared with the article that depicted a woman cab
driver, Muriel Peay, talking to the article's author on the street. The
caption did not name her, and the article did not refer to her. Although
the woman consented to be photographed, she did not know that the
picture would be used in an article on cheating cabbies. She was humiliated, and she sued the magazine. 1
Angry and insulted, these individuals could have done any number
of things to address their sense of injury and violation. They chose
to sue. In the past hundred years, in increasing number, Americans
have turned to the law to help them defend their reputations and
public images. The twentieth century saw the creation of what I
describe as a law of public image, and the phenomenon of personal

image litigation.
1

Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
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Under these laws of image, you can sue if you've been depicted in an
embarrassing manner, even if no one thinks less of you for it. If a newspaper or website publishes your picture in a way you find offensive, you
can, under certain circumstances, receive monetary damages for your
sense of affront - for the outrage that someone has taken liberties with
your public image and interfered with the way you want to be known
to others. These "laws of image" consist principally of the tort actions
for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentiona l infliction of emotional
distress.
One's image or public image, as I define it, is one's public face, the persona one projects to the world through such external signs and attributes as one's gestures, speech, dress, and social behavior. An image·
is something that one has, and that one creates: it is our conscious
extemalization of self. Image overlaps with, but is distinct from reputa·
tion, which is an external judgment - how other people see you. Image
law protects both the right to a good reputation and the right to one's
image - the right to control one's public image and to feel good about
one's public presentation of self.
These laws of image are a modem invention, created to address conceptions of the self and personal injury that have become dominant in
the United States in the past hundred years. This essay explores the
origins of these laws of image, tracing them to the rise of what I describe
as an image-conscious self, the modal self of our mass-mediated, mass
consumer society. The laws of image are an expression of a people who
have become fascinated - even obsessed - with their personal images;
who have come to see their images as coextensive with their identities,
so that an injury to one's image constitutes an injury to one's self.

***
The story begins at the end of the nineteent h century, with the rise of
major urban centers in the United States. In 1860, only 20 percent of
the population lived in towns of 2,500 or more. By 1900, a third of the
population lived in towns and cities. Between 1860 and 1910, America's
urban population increased sevenfold (Hofstadter 1955: 173).
The process of urbanization unsettled long-established ways of creating a social self. In small towns and villages, a person's social identity
had been a product of ongoing interactions with a known and familiar
community. While reputations and social identities were by no means
unchangeable, they were somewhat fixed. The collective memory in
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small communities was strong, and a person "knows better than to suppose that he can deceive [others] into thinking that he is something
radically different from what he is" (Blumenthal19 32: 44).
By contrast, in the cities, surrounded by strangers, one's social identity was more often a function of first impressions rather than continued contact. While in a small community there was little need for
an individual to carefully "signal" herself- to display her background,
beliefs, and social status on the surface of her appearance- the more
socially fluid and fragmented conditions of city life demanded that people externalize their identities. As sociologist George Simmel observed
in 1903, the "brevity and rarity" of meetings between individuals on
the streets and other urban venues created a desire to "make oneself
noticeable" upon first glance, to distinguish oneself through one's
manners, looks, and gestures (Simmel1950: 421).
The heightened importance of surfaces and first impressions led to
increased attention to the presentation of self in public. In the cities and large towns of the late nineteenth century, there was a new
preoccupation with mastering and perfecting one's social appearance.
"Impression management," to use sociologist Erving Goffman's phrase,
became an important personal project and goal (Goffman 1955).
People began to speak of life in theatrical metaphors - of social existence as an "act" on a "stage." One "performed" one's identity, went out
in public to "see and be seen." It was thought that these "presentational
performances" required proper costume, diction, and gestures; advice
and etiquette books, with elaborate instructions on how to dress, how
to greet people, and what to say in public, were issued at an unprecedented rate (Schlesinger 1946: 35).
Technological and industrial developments enhanced this attentiveness to self-presentation in public. Portrait photography was becoming
popular, and mass-produced clothing, ubiquitous by the 1890s, put a
fashionable appearance within the reach of the ordinary consumer
(Schorman 2003: 13). Advertisements encouraged people to scrutinize their appearances and to purchase items that would help them
enhance their looks and images. While public visibility had always
been an essential part of life for the famous, the notion that "everyone
could and should be looked at" was a novel, modern concept (Braudy
1997: 506).
By the late nineteenth century, individuals across the social
spectrum were being encouraged to cultivate an attitude toward their
bodies, appearances, and feelings that was strategic and instrumental.
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They were adopting an external perspective on themselves, considering
how they might appear before strangers, and seeing themselves as images
in the eyes of others (Kasson 1991: 114). There was to be a reward for this
scrupulous management of personal image - respect, upward mobility,
and the possibility of social and material success. Especially in the new
urban centers, where social hierarchies were unstable, it was thought that
the "self-made" man could create a new identity and advance socially by
appearing more refined and genteel than he really was.
To be clear: people were not becoming "superficial." We can see,
nonetheless, a new attentiveness to public images, and to potential
threats to those images. John Kasson, in his history of urban life and
manners in the nineteenth century, has noted the great fear in this
time of being discredited and "exposed"- that nosy neighbors, gossiping houseguests, and whispering co-workers might reveal the "truth"
behind one's social fa<;ade (Kasson 1991: 114). The mass media were
posing especially formidable threats to personal image, threats that the
average citizen was seemingly helpless to control, manage, or defend
against.

***
In the late 1800s, with urbanization, an expanding audience for publications, and advances in publishing technology, a massive volume of
printed material flooded the market. Mass-circulation magazines such
as the Ladies' Home Journal debuted and became popular (Kaestle and
Radway 2009: 57, 60-1). Total national circulation of monthly magazines rose from 18 million in 1890 to 64 million in 1905- nearly four
magazines per American household (ibid.: 103 ). Newspaper readership
increased 400 percent between 1870 and 1900, and the number of
newspapers doubled (Pember 1972: 10).
In the early 1800s, the typical subject of press coverage had been the
activities of "public figures" - politicians, public officials, captains of
industry. Publishers eventually realized that "human interest" stories "chatty little reports of tragic or comic incidents in the lives of the
people" - attracted more readers than dry copy about the comings and
goings of officials and statesmen (Hughes 1940, Dicken Garcia 1989:
64 ). Crimes, love affairs, divorces, holidays, social outings, illnesses,
births, deaths - matters of ordinary existence were scooped out of
neighborhoods by aggressive "roving reporters" and fed to a curious
public. "The interest in other people's affairs in this country is almost
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measureless," observed the Outlook magazine in 1896. "The morning
and evening papers make us feel as if we belonged to a great village
and ... as if our chief interest lay in what is going on at the other end
of the street" (The Passion for Publicity 1896: 738). In the 1880s
and 1890s, several states proposed and passed laws providing for civil
liability or criminal punishment for sensational press content. 2 There
was also a turn to the tort of libel.
For centuries, the twin torts of defamation - libel and slander - had
protected reputations against scandalous falsehoods. One's reputation
is one's good name among one's peers - the "estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place he is known."3 In order to be legally
actionable as a libel or slander, a statement had to be both defamatory
and false. A defamatory statement was one that seriously lowered a
person's esteem in his community: it "expose[d] a person to hatred or
contempt ... injure[d) him in his profession or trade, [and] cause[d] him
to be shunned by his neighbors" (Odgers 1887: 19). The rise of the
sensationalistic press and "human interest" journalism led to a surge
in libel lawsuits. In his study of tort litigation in turn of the century
New York, Randall Bergstrom found that the number of libel cases
before the New York Supreme Court increased by over twenty times
between 1870 and 1910 (Bergstrom 1992: 20). Francis Laurent's study
of a trial court in Wisconsin showed a significant increase in libel
cases between 1875 and 1914, most of them against local newspapers
(Laurent 1959:49, 164).
Initiating a lawsuit is, inevitably, an assertion of rights. When plaintiffs commenced a libel lawsuit, they were claiming, in effect, that they
had a legal entitlement to their reputations. There was nothing novel
about this. In theory, the common law had always protected reputation. Yet the fact that more people were claiming the right- that men
and women across the social spectrum felt compelled to bring libel
lawsuits - suggests not only that people saw their public images and
reputations as being especially imperiled, but also that those aspects of
the self had become more valuable and treasured. A good reputation
was a sign of virtue and rectitude; it was also critical to socioeconomic
mobility in the late 1800s, a time of greatly expanding opportunities
2

Several states passed laws that prohibited the publication of "criminal news, police
reports ... or accounts of ... bloodshed, lust, or crime." See Winters v. New York, 333
507 (1948).
Cooper v. Greeley & McElrath, 1 Denio, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).

u.s.

3
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for social advancement. There was another reason for this protectiveness of reputation - Americans' increasing image-consciousness, their
attunement to social appearances and the impressions they made in the
eyes of others.

***
Defamation law dealt with false statements that lowered one's standing
among one's peers. It did not always or adequately address the problem of media "gossip" -facts that were often true, and that did not
necessarily injure reputation, but nonetheless caused humiliation and
distress. The search for legal remedies for the gossip problem led to the
invention of the legal "right to privacy," credited to the famous 1890
Harvard Law Review article "The Right to Privacy."
The article, by the future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis and
his colleague Samuel Warren, attacked gossip columns and information about personal affairs "spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers." "Persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concerns" were "being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity" (Brandeis and Warren 1890: 193 ). To a dignified person seeking
respect and status, having the details of one's personal life publicized
in the press caused embarrassment and "mental pain and distress," "far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury" (ibid.: 214).
The article accused the press of "invading privacy" when it revealed
a person's emotions, activities, and personal idiosyncrasies before a
public audience, even though such matters were not "private," in the
sense of being secret or concealed. Newspapers could "invade privacy"
when they published a person's photograph, even if it was taken at a
public event, or when they described one's participation in social activities such as weddings or balls. The article discussed the recent case of
Manola v. Stevens, involving flash photographs of an actress obtained
without her permission as she appeared on the stage (Brandeis and
Warren 1890: 195). The description of a woman at a social gathering
was technically not "private," nor were pictures of an actress performing in public. These publications were nonetheless said to "invade privacy" because in presenting the subject out of context, and before an
audience not of her own choosing, they impaired her ability to create
her own social identity, to define her public image as she wished.
Brandeis and Warren proposed a common law cause of action that
would allow the victims of such "invasions of privacy" to sue and
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recover monetary damages (Brandeis and Warren 1890: 219). Unlike
libel, their tort of invasion of privacy did not protect a person's esteem
in the eyes of others so much as one's capacity to define his own public
persona: "the right of determining ... to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others" (ibid.: 198).
The right to privacy was the right to keep one's personal affairs out of
the public eye, and more broadly, to determine one's own public image
without undue interference from the mass media: A manifestation of
the emerging image consciousness of the time, it was the right to control one's public image and to receive damages for injuries to one's feelings about one's image. By 1910, eight states had recognized a "right to
privacy" as a right to control one's public image and to protect one's
image against unwanted, humiliating media depictions. 4

***
As the image-conscious sensibility gained purchase on the popular imagination in the twentieth century, and the mass media posed
ongoing threats to people's public images, existing areas of law were
expanded and new laws created to protect what was being described
as a right to one's public image. In the 1930s and 1940s, a majority
of states recognized the tort right to privacy, described as a right to
avoid undesirable and "unwarranted publicity."5 Libel claims increased,
and courts expanded libel doctrine to reach a wider range of emotional
harms and image-based harms. In a number of different contexts, courts
were recognizing a right to one's image, and the personal image lawsuit
became a fixture of American legal culture.

***
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the United States
became an image society, marked by an escalating cultural emphasis on
images, surfaces, and social appearances. An especially intense brand
4

5

At common law: Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
Pritchett v. Knox Cty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 85 N.E. 32 (Ind. App. 1908); Foster-Millburn
Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909), appeal after remand, 127 S.W. 476 (Ky. 1910);
Schulman v. Whital<er, 39 So. 737 (La. 1906); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (N.J. E.
and A. 1907). By statute: New York, 1903, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law§ 50; Utah, 1909,
Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-4-8 and 76-4-9; Virginia, 1904, Va. Code Ann.§ 8-650.
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1940).
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of image consciousness took root in the 1920s, a decade that is often
described by historians as the first "modem" decade in US historyone that saw the rise of a mass society, the mass media, mass-marketed
products, and increasing cultural standardization and homogeneity
(see Dumenil1 995).
In 1920, the census registered, for the first time, more Americans
living in cities than in rural areas (McNeese and Jensen 2010: 107).
As sociologists Robert Park and Ernest Burgess wrote in their 1925
study The City, the contacts of the city might have been face-to-face,
"but they are ... superficial, transitory, and segmental" (Wirth 1938:
12). The perceived depersonalization of daily life, and the superficiality of social exchange, produced something of an existential crisis fo'r
Americans in this time. American culture became preoccupied with
the dilemma of personal distinctio n- the difficulty of "standing out
from the crowd." How could one preserve a sense of self amidst a sea of
strangers? The answer posed by advertisers, personnel managers, psychologists and other cultural arbiters lay in personal image - a distinctive appearance, "magnetic personality," and pleasing first impression.
A "winning image" was one that was so stunning and unforgettable -so
charismatic and appealing - as to secure for a person instant notice.
As a practical matter, the cultivation of a positive image had practical application in many areas of life in which the rise of a mass society
and constant interactio n with strangers posed very real and tangible
problems of distinction and recognition. One domain in which the
positive image and first impression was coming to be seen a critical
asset was the burgeoning white-collar sector of the economy - business,
sales, and customer relations. Success in these areas, it was said, hinged
on the ability to cultivate a pleasing image - on "salesmanship," "people skills," and brand recognition. The basis of effective selling was
the positive first impression - creating a desirable image of a product
and, even more, of the salesperson. Before long, the imperatives of the
world of sales and service were applied to social relations more generally. The efforts of salespeople to sell products to skeptical customers
became a metaphor for the social struggle waged by every person in an
effort to distinguish themselves in the modem world. Attracting the
attention and positive regard of strangers, the basis of success in any
pursuit, demanded that an individual put forth an ideal impression on
the first try.
The relatively new advertising industry, in conjuncti on with the
new field of popular psychology, promised individuals that they could
209
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use conspicuous consumption and the strategic display of goods to
achieve a stunning image, distinguish themselves from the crowd,
and "win friends and influence people" (Carnegie, Carnegie, and Pell
1936). Advertisers heightened concerns with personal image; the mission of the ad agency was to create discomforts and dissatisfactions with
one's image that could only be assuaged through purchasing goods.
Advertisers encouraged consumers to see themselves through the
searching gaze of strangers who needed to be persuaded or impressed.
"Do you wonder, when you meet a casual friend, whether your nose
is shiny?" asked an ad for Woodbury's Soap. "Do you anxiously consult store windows and vanity cases at every opportunity?" (Peiss 1998:
142). Ads played upon popular insecurities with identity and appearance, and they reinforced the perception that images were essential to
social advancement (Marchand 1986: 14).
The 1920s gave rise to a new, defining phenomeno n of American
society, perhaps the single greatest force behind the new culture
of images - the entertainme nt celebrity. The United States became
a "celebrity culture." Film actors, who had seemingly mastered the
art of "impression management," became role models and cultural
heroes. Audiences were fascinated with the way film actors put themselves together - how they created a stunning image and constantly
manipulated that image to please, amuse, and fascinate others. In the
image-conscious culture, the actor had become the modal self.

***
In the period between the two world wars, the mass media suffused
and transformed American life. Daily newspaper circulation increased
.from 22.4 million copies in 1910 to 39.6 million copies in the 1930s.
Ninety percent of Americans were estimated to be newspaper readers
(Lee 1947: 731). Nearly 4,500 periodicals were published each year
in the 1930s and circulated a combined 180 million copies per issue
(Kyvig 2004: 190-1). By the end of the decade, half the homes in the
United States contained at least two radios, which were on for about
five hours a day (Cashman 1989).
The proliferation of mass communications brought more injuries to
public images and reputations, and with them, the continued expansion
of libel law and litigation. As soon as radio and motion pictures were
popularized, their creators were sued for libel. The threat of libel litigation had become so significant that major newspapers, magazines, and
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book publishing houses retained libel lawyers for prepublication review,
and insurance organizations began writing libel and slander insurance
for publishers and broadcasters (Berger 1937, Thayer 1943: 340).
Libel doctrine transformed and expanded to meet the demands
of the image-conscious society. In the 1930s and 1940s, courts were
broadening the definition of a defamatory publication. A defamatory
publication was not only one that cast a person into disrepute. A publication could be defamatory if it tarnished a person's reputation or
image in his own eyes, causing mental distress (Wade 1962: 1093-5). In
1935, the torts scholar Calvert Magruder noted an increasing number
of libel cases where plaintiffs had won damages, not for an objective
loss of reputation, but for "the sense of outrage and chagrin that the
defendant should have made an attack upon his reputation" (Magruder
1935: 1055). Courts were turning their focus from external, interpersonal relations inward, to the realm of one's self-perception and one's
feelings about one's public image.
Thus it was that a court held that a woman had a cause of action
for libel when a newspaper said that she had been served with process while sitting in a bathtub - an accusation that did not impute
immoral conduct or likely damage her reputation, but nonetheless
embarrassed her. 6 In Zbyszko v. New York American, from 1930, the
newspaper had published an article on the theory of evolution. In one
part of the article, the text read: "The Gorilla is probably closer to
man, both in body and in brain, than any other species of ape now
alive. The general physique of the Gorilla is closely similar to an athletic man of today, and the mind of a young gorilla is much like the
mind of a human baby." Near that text appeared a photograph of the
wrestler Stanislaus Zbyszko, in a wrestling pose, and under it a caption: "Stanislaus Zbyszko, the Wrestler, Not Fundamentally Different
from the Gorilla in Physique." 7 Though it was unlikely that any reader
would think worse of the wrestler for this, the jury sympathized with his
sense of affront and awarded him $25,000 (A Collect As You Go Tour
of the Publisher's Chain 1936: 50).
The major development in image law was the growing recognition of
the tort of invasion of privacy. By 1940 the privacy tort, as a right to control one's public image, had been recognized in at least fifteen jurisdictions
(Nizer 1940: 526, 536). The Restatement of Torts acknowledged the tort in
6

7

Snyder v. New York Press Co., 137 A.D. 291, 121 N.Y.S. 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910).
Zbyszko v. New York American, 228 A.D. 277, 239 N.Y.S. 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930).
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1939: "a person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited
to the public is liable to the other," read its summation (American Law
Institute 1939: 389). At a time of great public criticism of media invasions of privacy, and increasing cultural demands to control and perfect
one's public image, there was much popular support for the privacy tort.
Media audiences wanted to gawk, to peer in on others' lives, even to be
voyeurs, but were upset when the gaze was turned back on them.
It was not total solitude, concealment, or anonymity that people
seemed to want, but rather selective self-exposure. In an age when actors
and other performers were seen as cultural heroes, celebrated for their
personal lifestyles, publicity of one's private affairs was not always unwelcome, intrusive, or annoying. In a celebrity culture, being thrust into
the spotlight for one's proverbial15 minutes of notoriety was, for some,
an appealing possibility. Many of the "gregarious millions," "crave to be
lifted out of the morass of anonymity," and believed that "any publicity,
even though unfavorable, is better than none at all" (Ragland 1928: 87).
Regardless of whether one sought fame or was content in the confines
of a narrower world, control over one's publicity and public image the ability to put one's own "spin" on one's persona- was seen as critical. Writers discussed the importance of a broad legal right to control
one's image, a right to create one's image on one's own terms. In the
face of "multiplying hordes of newsmongers," a "right to privacy" was
essential (Levy 1935: 190).

***
A few privacy cases from this time involved the publication of deeply
intimate, personal material. In 1939, Time magazine published an article titled "Starving Glutton," about a woman who had a metabolic
disorder that led her to eat huge quantities without gaining weight.
The picture published with the article, taken by a reporter over the
woman's protests, showed Dorothy Barber in bed in a long-sleeved hospital gown. She sued for invasion of privacy and won damages at trial.
"Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the
right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an individual personal condition ... without personal publicity," an appeals
court concluded, upholding the judgment. 8
8

Barberv. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
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The majority of privacy cases did not involve publications that
were especially private, however. Truly intimate depictions - deeply
personal gossip, explicit stories about people's romantic affairs, lurid
photographs - were typically not the subject of lawsuits; legal action
would only attract further attention to the sensitive, embarrassing
material (Dawson 1948: 39). Instead, most privacy cases involved situations where people had been presented in a manner they found unfavorable, misrepresentative, upsetting, or annoying, even though the
activities portrayed were not especially scandalous, personal or secret.
A number of privacy suits, for example, involved photographs of a person taken on the street and published without consent. In these cases,
the law of privacy had very little to do with "privacy." No exposure
of "private life" had occurred. Rather, the right to privacy was a right
to not be depicted in a fashion that contradicted one's own, desired
self-presentation, "under circumstances which are complimentary as
well as those which are critical."9 "Privacy" was about the right to
choose one's own audiences, about shielding people from unwanted
publicity that clashed with how they wanted to be known to the public.
In the 1929 case ]ones v. Herald Post, a woman named Lillian Jones
witnessed her husband assaulted and stabbed to death on the street,
and tried to fight back against the attackers. She sued for invasion of
privacy when the Louisville Herald Post published her picture with a
truthful account of her heroic efforts. She claimed that the publication
was offensive to her. In Hillman v. Star Publishing, a woman sued the
Seattle Star for invasion of privacy when it ran her photo along with
an article about her father's arrest for mail fraud. She claimed that this
caused her "shame, humiliation, and a sense of disgrace." 10
The plaintiff in Blumenthal v. Picture Classics was an "elderly and
respectable" woman, a bread vendor, who sued over newsreel footage
that depicted her selling her wares on the streets of the lower East Side.
The footage was a candid, unaltered street scene, part of a newsreel
titled "Sight Seeing in New York with Nick and Tony." The woman
complained that the portrayal was "foolish, unnatural, and undignified," and an "invasion of privacy." A trial court issued an injunction
restraining the distribution of the newsreel.U In Sweenek v. Pathe News,
9
10
11

Hull v. Curtis Pub. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wn. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911).
Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1932).
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from 1936, a woman claimed that unauthorized newsreel footage taken
of her in an exercise course for overweight women - "a group of corpulent women attempting to reduce with the aid of some rather novel
and unique apparatus" -was an invasion of privacy because the footage
was embarrassing.
Some of these lawsuits- though certainly not all- could be described
as fairly petty. The law professor Harry Kalven, Jr believed that most
parties who came forward with privacy claims had "shabby, unseemly
grievances and an interest in exploitation." "I suspect that the fascination with the great Brandeis trade mark, excitement over the law
at a point of growth, and appreciation of privacy as a key value have
combined to dull the normal critical sense of judges and commentators
and have caused them not to see the pettiness of the tort they have
sponsored," he wrote in an article titled "Privacy in Tort Law- Were
Brandeis and Warren Wrong?" (Kalven 1966: 332).
Even the most seemingly 'thin-skinned' of these plaintiffs were not
necessarily insincere or duplicitous, however. Although we can't know
for sure, the men and women presented in an inaccurate or otherwise
displeasing manner in various newsreels, comic strips, and articles may
well have been hurt. This sense of injury and affront is a testament to
the image consciousness of the time. It is only in a culture where people
feel deeply possessive and protective of their public images that such
misrepresentations, even if objectively benign, will be experienced as
serious harms. h is only in a culture that has invested great importance
in images, that has freighted public images with such emotional and
psychological weight, that the law will recognize such harms and take
them seriously. The law tracked the growing cultural focus on personal
image, and in recognizing these "privacy" claims as worthy of judicial
attention, and in some cases monetary judgments, courts validated,
even heightened the image-conscious sensibility.

***
Sympathetic to the importance of public image, and plaintiffs' interests
in controlling and shaping their public personae, courts provided relief
in a number of these cases. Yet at the same time as the courts were
recognizing a right to one's image that made embarrassing or distressing media representations legally actionable, they were also acknowledging another kind of image right: the rights of publishers, writers,
and filmmakers to depict people's likenesses and life stories, and the
214
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public's right to consume them. In a culture where politics and social
life were being transacted through images, where media images had
become the conunon currency of social exchange, the ability to freely
depict individuals and public affairs was critical to the "free and robust''
public discourse that was beginning to be described as a central value
of the First Amendment. By the 1940s, imposing liability for truthful
commentary about a person, even if distressing to him, was coming ·to
be seen as a form of state control over expression that smacked of the
totalitarian governments in Europe and Asia against which the United
States was at war.
Brandeis and Warren and courts adjudicating early twentiethcentury privacy cases had recognized a privilege that would exempt the
publication of "matters of public interest," or "matters of public concern." Before the 1930s, the definition of a "matter of public concern"
had been narrow. What was a matter of "public concern" or "public
interest" was not what actually interested the public- for then gossip
and sensationalism might be immune -but rather, what judges believed
that the public should know, in its own best interest. In the 1930s and
1940s, courts began to expand the "matters of public interest" privilege.
Purely entertaining, titillating publications, such as a highly dramatized
account of a criminal trial, gossip columns, and even murder mysteries were said to be matters of legitimate "public interest" or "public
concern" that could be written about freely, even if the individuals
involved were unwilling to be publicized. 12 For judges to create their
own definition of "matters of public interest," one that overrode the
media's publishing decisions and implicitly, the public's consumption
choices, was to some courts an impermissible censorship of the press.
Because there was great curiosity about public figures' private
lives, their personal affairs were usually "matters of public interest,"
said courts. As such, public figures - defined as those who submitted
themselves to "public approval" - had very little in the way of privacy
(American Law Institute 1939). According to some courts, even ordinary people "waived" their right to privacy when they went into public
places, or were involved in "matters of public interest" (ibid.). In Jones
v. Herald Post, involving the woman who tried to attack her husband's
murderer, the court concluded that the woman had, albeit unwillingly,
12

Colyer c. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 A.D. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (N.Y. App. Div.
1914); Elmhurstv. Pearson, 80U.S.App. D.C. 372,153 F.2d467 (1946); Middleton v.
News Syndicate Co., 162 Misc. 516, 295 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. Misc. 1937).
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become an "innocent actor in a great tragedy in which the public had a
deep concern," and as such, it was not an invasion of privacy to publish
her photograph. 13 Insofar as they generated public interest or curiosity,
there was "no invasion of a right of privacy in the description of the
ordinary goings and comings of a person or of weddings, even though
intended to be entirely private." 14
Not everyone in the legal world endorsed this expansive view of
privileged material. To some, the public's interest in learning about
people and public affairs, and the right of the press to convey that information, did not justify interfering with a person's public image when
that interference created serious emotional or psychic harm. There was
a battle underway. The ideals of modem expressive freedom cut both
ways: liberty meant the right to express oneself through one's image,
and at the same time, the freedom to make images of others. This tension would trouble courts, lawyers, legal theorists, and the public in the
coming decades. When were the media justified in overriding people's
right to create their own images? Could the right to one's image and the
freedom to image be reconciled?

***
In the post-Second World War era, courts imposed further limitations
on the image torts in the name of freedom of speech and the public's
"right to know." Despite this, the proliferation of the media, new communication technologies, and a cultural focus on personal images and
"image management" led to the significant growth of image law and
personal image litigation. There was deep cultural confusion around
image laws and image rights. At the same time that the laws of image
were being narrowed, they expanded to accommodate people's increasing protectiveness of their public images in an image-saturated society,
what was being described as an "age of images" (Boorstin 1962).

***
In postwar America, images - of affluence, desire, mobility, and fame "reached ... into every comer of our daily lives," observed historian
Daniel Boorstin (1962: 249). The Second World War had brought
13

14

]ones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky Ct. App. 1929).
Barberv. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
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with it unprecedented prosperity, and the middle-class lifestyle came
within the reach of millions. By the end of the 1950s, most families
owned their homes, their cars, and a television set. It was a culture
of appearance and aspiration; advertising in glossy magazines and on
television spread bright pictures of consumer products and their happy
users for envy and emulation.
In his landmark work The Lonely Crowd, sociologist David Riesman
wrote of the rise of a new personality type that was emerging as an "influential minority" in "contemporary, highly industrialized, and bureaucratic America," particularly among "the upper middle-class of our
larger cities" (Riesman 1950: 19). He called this the "other-directed"
personality (ibid.: 9). The "other-directed" individua l- the product Of
an affluent, mobile, consumerist society - was deeply concerned with
his image and appearance; he continually reinvented and adjusted his
public persona in an effort to please and impress others. Riesman noted
the manifestations of this other-directed orientatio n in various cultural
practices and texts of the time, from children's novels to stories and ads
in women's magazines that dealt with "modes of manipulating the self
in order to manipulate others," for the attainmen t of such "intangible
assets" as prestige, acceptance and affection (ibid.: 106).
This "other-direction" - an orientatio n toward appearances, surfaces, packaging, glamour, and perfecting and controlling one's image
in the eyes of others - should be familiar to us, with its origins in the
pre-Second World War era. There were, however, significant developments in postwar culture that escalated the emphasis on personal
image and image management. By the 1950s, the number of whitecollar workers outnumbered blue-collar workers for the first time in
US history. Labor power, more than ever, took the form of "personality" and "people skills." The burgeoning service occupations placed on
their participants intense requirements for managed self-presentation in sociologist Erving Goffman's words, that "one give a perfectly homogeneous performance at every appointed time" (Goffman 1955: 56).
The phrase "personal image" first entered popular culture in the 1960s.
With willpower and focus, advised a 1962 business success manual
titled The Magic Power of Putting Yourself Over with People, "you can
have the kind of personal image you want," and through your image,
"sell yourself' to others (Arnold 1962).
The guiding theme of postwar advertising was that everyone and
everything had an image that could be successfully marketed to anyone if presented convincingly enough. Advertising surged in the 1950s.
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By the mid-1950s, the United States was spending $9 billion annually
to sell products (Moskowitz 2001: 157). As ever, product advertisements
encouraged consumers to view themselves with the critical gaze of spectators, as performers under the constant scrutiny of friends and strangers.
Other "image industries" flourished; the affluent society generated and
consumed media images in unprecedented volume. Newspaper circulation reached historic highs (Young and Young 2004: 153). A paperback "revolution" in the 1950s made books available for only 25 cents
(Burress 1989: 73). The cosmetics industry was selling over $1 billion a
year, and the garment industry was producing $2 billion dollars' worth
of goods annually (Koshetz 1952: F1; Breines 2001: 95).
Celebrity culture flourished, and it spread beyond the realm of
entertainment to virtually every other area of endeavor. The massmediated "superstar" was emblematic of the age, obsessed as it was with
images, entertainment, and fame. Celebrities knit together a national
culture based on shared images -"Jackie's hairdo, Marilyn Monroe's
pout, Marlon Brando's swagger" (Farber and Foner 1994: 49). As ever,
the essence of celebrity remained style rather than substance. Modem
celebrity rewarded those who had appealing lifestyles and personalities,
and who could project those personalities in an alluring fashion. Since
media attention - and little else - was the basis of fame, it remained an
eminently democratic aspiration. Celebrities continued to serve as role
models of successful self-presentation, and there was great fascination
with the ways that stars publicized themselves, how they transformed,
manipulated, and spun their images. The public was enthralled with
"backstages," with the activities of publicists and press agents, and
the inner workings of Hollywood and other image-making "factories"
(Boorstin 1965: 194).
. In his widely acclaimed 1962 book The Image: A Guide to Pseudo
Events in America, Daniel Boorstin observed that the United States
had entered an "age of images." Like Riesman, Boorstin lamented what
he saw as the alienating effects of mass communication and mass consumption, the vaunting of surfaces over depth, and the centrality of
simulated, vicarious experiences to cultural life (Pells 1985: 225-56).
Politics had become a form of shadow theater, enacted through television clips, sound bytes, press conferences, and other staged "pseudoevents," Boorstin (1965: 194) wrote. It was becoming a matter offaith
that the right image could "elect a President or sell an automobile, a
religion, a cigarette, or a suit of clothes" (ibid.: 192). "Before the age of
images, it was common to think of a conventional person as one who
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strove for an ideal of decency or respectability." Now one tried to "fit
into the images found vividly all around him." "We have fallen in love
with our own image, with images of our making, which turn out to be
images of ourselves" (ibid.: 192).

***
The state of image law and litigation reflected the growth of the media,
its heightened sensationalism, and the image consciousness in the culture of the time. Legal protections for personal image, and one's right to
control one's image, increased in the postwar era, as did Americans' use
of the law to protect those interests. Libel assumed increasing prominence in legal and popular culture, and privacy law and litigation
expanded.
At its 1953 meeting, the American Newspaper Publishers'
Association noted that libel claims against newspapers were on the
rise. Arthur Hanson, counsel for the ANPA, claimed that the number
oflibel suits had grown by several100 percent in the 1950s (Rosenberg
1995: 247). According to one torts treatise, libel suits had been far
"more numerous" in the 1950s than in previous years (Miller 1952:
191). There was great inflation in the size of judgments and claims;
some plaintiffs were claiming that their reputations were worth millions (Rosenberg 1995: 247; Forde 2008: 113).
Courts continued to expand the definition of a defamatory publication to include representations that were not necessarily harmful to a
person's social relations, but that were nonetheless injurious to his feelings about his image (Developments in the Law of Defamation 1956:
881). As the law professor Edward Blaustein summarized in 1964, there
was an "increasing tendency" in the law of defamation to go "beyond
the traditional reaches" of the protection of reputation to protect "personal humiliation and degradation" (Blaustein 1964: 993 ). Law professor John Wade noted that "the law of defamation has been expanded
to include certain situations where there was no real injury to plaintiff's
reputation but he was held up to ridicule or otherwise subjected to
mental disturbance" (Wade 1962: 1094 ).
By the late twentieth century, the bulk of the money paid out in damage awards in defamation suits went to "compensate for psychic injury,
rather than any objectively verifiable damage to one's reputation,"
observed law professor Rodney Smolla ( 1986: 24). The tort's protected
interest broadened from "extrinsic, community-based reputation" to
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"freedom from psychic or emotional harm to the individual" (Bezanson
1988: 541). The focus of the action, in many instances, is the "decline
in self-reputation" suffered by the plaintiff. The actions for defamation
and privacy were converging; courts were "assimilat[ing] defamation
cases to privacy" (Kalven 1966: 334).

***
In the 1950s, the privacy tort came into its own. The number of privacy cases more than doubled that of any previous decade (Pember
1972: 147). By the 1960s, there were more than 300 reported privacy
cases, most of them involving the media (Kalven 1972: 361). "How
many more (privacy cases) are settled in lower courts or out of court
cannot even be estimated," wrote Journalism Quarterly in 1953. "The
number of cases can be said to be definitely increasing" (Davis 1953:
187). By 1960, the invasion of privacy tort was "declared to exist by
the overwhelming majority of American courts" (Prosser 1960: 389).
In 1963, a forty-four-year-old mother, Flora Bell Graham, the wife of
a chicken farmer from rural Cullman County, Alabama, attended the
county fair with her sons, and she went with them into a fun house. As
she left, her dress was blown up by air jets- part of the "fun." A photographer from the local paper got a snapshot, and the picture of the
woman ran on the front page. Even though the picture was taken in a
public place, the trial court made an award of several thousand dollars,
upheld by the state's Supreme Court. "Not only was th[e] photograph
embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities," the court concluded, but
was "offensive to modesty or decency" to the point of being "obscene"
(County Fair Picture 1964). 15
It was not only suggestive or explicit portrayals that invaded privacy. Courts found invasions of privacy in all manner of media depictions that plaintiffs claimed to be embarrassing, offensive, or otherwise
injurious to their public images. The film industry was a real "target
for invasion of privacy lawsuits," noted one publishing trade journal
in 1953 (Davis 1953: 187). A California trial court issued a $290,000
judgment against the film company Loew's Inc over a complaint by a
woman who was the model for an Army nurse in the film They Were
Expendable. The court found that depicting her romance with a Navy
lieutenant on screen was an invasion of her privacy (ibid.).
15

Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So2d 474 (Ala. 1964 ).
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Privacy cases continued to be brought- and won- over publications
that were benign in most people's eyes, in some cases even complimentary, albeit displeasing to the subjects of publicity. In the early 1960s,
Warren Spahn, the famous baseball player, sued over an unauthorized
biography that he claimed was too flattering. The biography depicted
him as a war hero who had been awarded the Bronze Star. Spahn had
served in the Army, but had not been decorated. The book also inaccurately portrayed his relationship with his father, who appeared in the
story as a kind mentor and coach, and it incorporated false, invented
dialog. Spahn found all this to be offensive, sued for invasion of privacy, and was successful at trial. Spahn later told an interviewer that he
was embarrassed at the way his military experience had been glorified
and was concerned that people would think he planted the account
to make himself look heroic (Yasser 2008: 49). The publication was
enjoined and Spahn awarded damages. 16
The "privacy" right to one's public image was widely supported, in
both popular culture and in the legal world. The idea of a legal right to
protect one's public image against unwanted or distorted media depictions resonated with the cultural ideals in the image-conscious society.
Privacy was the individual's "rightful claim ... to determine the extent
to which he wishes to share himself with others," in the words of one
legal scholar. Everyone had a right to "choose those portions of the
individual which are to be made public" (Breckenridge 1970: 1-3).
Wrote one federal judge, "in a society predicated on individual rights,
each person should be entitled to choose the face he or she wishes to
present to the public unless that right is waived or some other right is
paramount" (Forer 1987: 19).

***
The privacy right to control one's personal image was prized in postwar
America, but freedom of speech had also become a core cultural and
legal value. The student movement of the 1960s had begun with the
famous Berkeley free speech protests, and the right to dissent, question
authority, and challenge the status quo was a critical demand of the
counterculture (Farber and Foner 1994: 196-8). In the era of Vietnam,
the Pentagon Papers, anticommunist purges, and the public revelation
of extensive government spying, political criticism was being described
16

Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966).
221

SAMANTHA BARBAS

as a "public duty". 17 The "crusading journalist," risking punishment to
expose injustice, was romanticized in the popular culture of the time
(Gajda 2009: 1039).
The Supreme Court's protection of free speech was unprecedented.
Between the end of the Second World War and the 1970s, the Court
issued decisions that protected a wide range of previously proscribed
material (Hale 1987: 3, Strossen 1996: 71-2). Almost three-fourths
of the free speech cases that came before the Court in the 1950s and
1960s were decided in favor of free expression (Strossen 1996: 69). The
Court's opinions described free expression as an important personal liberty, furthering "self-fulfillment," and the "right to autonomous control
over the development and expression of one's intellect, tastes, and personalities."18 The ability to freely express one's thoughts, beliefs, and personal identity was seen as essential to the growth and enhancement of
the individual (Sandel1998: 80). Decisions also emphasized the importance of freedom of speech and press to democratic self-governance
through "public discussion" (New York Times v. Sullivan [1964]). With
the public dependent on the mass media as a source of information
about public affairs, "a broadly defined freedom of the press" was necessary to "assure the maintenance of our political system and an open
society." 19
In this free speech zeitgeist, courts often dismissed privacy suits
against the media under the common law "matters of public interest"
privilege. Fearing a "judicial censorship" of the press, courts continued
to define the content of the popular media as synonymous with the
"public interest." In this view, if something appeared in the "press"- a
film, novel, television episode, or even tabloid or detective magazine by definition, it was a matter of public interest, and "newsworthy." The
public had a "right to be informed," whether the information was mate'rial about a politician's home and family life or a sensationalistic article
about a homicide in Official Detective Stories magazine. 20
Every person, celebrity or not, surrendered one's right to privacy by
becoming part of an event that was a "newsworthy" matter of public concern, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in the view of some
17
18

19

20

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Blount v. T.D. Pub. Corp., 423 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1967); Kapellas v. Koffman, 1 Cal. 3d
20, 31, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
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courts. A newspaper that ran a large picture of a murdered boy's decomposed body was not liable to the boy's parents. The court concluded
that the boy, albeit unwillingly, became part of an event of "public
interest" by virtue of being murdered and waived his right to privacy. 21
Likewise, given live television coverage, the paparazzi, and the increasing presence of cameras in public, people were said to "assume the risk"
of unwanted publicity whenever they went outside their homes. The
dominant rule was that "photographers on public property may take
pictures of anyone they want to, objection or not" (The Press: Freedom
to Photograph 1954).
In the seventy years after the famous Brandeis and Warren invention, the legal action for invasion of privacy, as the right to one's public·
image, had developed, flourished, and been pruned back by courts that
could not reconcile that right with American society's dependence on
media images, and its commitment to freedom of expression. The history of American image law is a saga of simultaneous expansion and
limitation- the increasing recognition of personal image rights over
the course of the twentieth century, and at the same time, their restriction by legal doctrines and concepts of freedom of speech.
***

By the 1970s, the modern doctrines of the tort laws of image had been
established, as had the "image-conscious sensibility." As this chapter
has illustrated, the twentieth century witnessed the rise of a cultural
attitude or outlook, rooted in the middleclass but not limited to it, in
which the self is conceptualized in terms of images. Influenced by a variety of cultural forces, from the "image industries" to celebrity culture
to the mobile and fluid conditions of modern, urban life, Americans
became aware of having public images and being images: one's identity
was embedded, at least in part, in the image or persona one strategically
constructed and presented to others. In a world of crowds, surfaces,
and distant and impersonal social relations, the ability to perfect and
manage one's image came to be regarded as critical to social mobility,
public recognition, and material success. Individuals from a variety of
backgrounds and circumstances asserted that they owned their images,
that they had an entitlement to their images and a right to control
them, and that this prerogative was critical to their ability to live and
21

Bremmerv. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Ia 817, 76 N.W.2d 762, 766-67 {Ia, 1956).

223

SAMANTHA BARBAS

function as free and self-determining individuals, and to pursue the
fabled American Dream.
The law both responded to and contributed to this focus on images
and the rise of the image-conscious self. By the 1940s, as we have seen,
a body of tort law protected the individual's public image, their ability
to control this image, and their feelings about their image. We saw the
expansion of litigation in these areas, and despite doubts and resist·
ance among some sectors, widespread support for these laws - in the
judiciary, among academics, in the public at large. Tort law became a
venue for, and participant in, modem America's intense concerns with
personal image.
Personal image was legalized: images, and people's feelings about their
images, came to be viewed as appropriate matters for legal intervention,
regulation, and supervision. This is not to say that every person who
was insulted, maligned, or misrepresented undertook legal action far from it. Most libels, "invasions of privacy," and other image-based
harms never made it to a lawyer, never made it to court. They were
endured, or dealt with informally. I am not suggesting that Americans
have been litigious around their reputations and public images in any
absolute sense. We can see, nonetheless, a growing "claims consciousness" around personal image (Kalven 1966: 338). As the law expanded
its authority over image-based harms and emotional harms, as privacy
and libel litigation gained publicity and apparent social approval, there
was a popular awareness that affronts to one's public persona could be
dealt with legally, if one chose - that legal recourse was one avenue,
among many, that could be pursued, and perhaps should be pursued.
The effect of this legalization of image, I suggest, was to validate
and reinforce the sense of possessiveness and protectiveness toward
one's public image and persona. In acknowledging a right to control
· one's image and one's feelings about one's image, the law affirmed the
image-conscious sensibility. As in so many other areas of conduct, the
law marked out a terrain of normative, socially acceptable behavior and
feeling, through the reasonableness, or "reasonable person" standard
(Green 1968: 241). Particularly in the latter half of the twentieth cen·
tury, courts and juries often defined the reasonable person with respect
to image as an individual who was conscious of, and quite sensitive to,
their social appearance; who was likely to be hurt, perhaps deeply so,
when publicized in a false, misleading, miscontextualized or humiliating
manner - or in any fashion that sharply clashed with their own selfimage. While there was much disagreement as to the thickness of the
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normal person's skin, and the free speech limitations on image rights,
the law recognized emotional distress as a reasonable response to a tar·
nished or distorted public persona, and deemed such injuries significant
enough to merit recognition and recompense, although perhaps less
so than some may have wished. This legal affirmation legitimated the
seriousness toward personal image that was being cultivated and urged
upon the public by the other cultural forces we have seen. Free speech
limitations notwithstanding, American culture embraced the idea of a
legal right to be vindicated and compensated for image-based harms,
part of a broader, fundamental right to possess and control the self.
References
"A Collect as you Go Tour of the Publisher's Chain." (1936). Newsweek,
February 22.
Arnold, Stanley Norman. (1962). The Magic Power of Putting Yourself Over
with People. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Berger, M. Marvin. (1937). "Detecting Libel Before It Appears." Editor and
Publisher, May 29.
Bergstrom, Randolph E. (1992). Courting Danger: Injury and Law in New York
City, 1870-1910. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bezanson, Randall. (1988). "The Libel Tort Today." Washington and Lee Law
Review 45:535-56.
Blaustein, Edward. (1964). "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser." New York University Law Review 39:962-1007.
Blumenthal, Albert. ( 193 2). Small-Town Stuff. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Boorstin, Daniel J. (1992). The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America.
New York: Vintage Books.
Brandeis, Louis and Samuel Warren. (1890). "The Right to Privacy." Harvard
Law Review 4:193-220.
Braudy, Leo. (1986). The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and Its History. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Breckenridge, Adam Carlyle. (1970). The Right to Privacy. Lincoln, NB:
University of Nebraska Press.
Breines, Wini. (1992). Young, White, and Miserable: Growing Up Female in the
Fifties. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Burress, Lee. (1989). Battle of the Books: Literary Censorship in the Public Schools,
1950-1985. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Carnegie, Dale, Dorothy Carnegie, and Arthur R. Pell. (1981). How to Win
Friends and Influence People. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Cashman, Sean Dennis. ( 1989 ). America in the Twenties and Thirties: The Olympian
Age of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New York: New York University Press.

225

SAMANTHA BARBAS

"County Fair Picture." (1964). Editor and Publisher, May 30.
Davis, Norris. (1953). "Invasion of Privacy: A Study in Contradictions."
Journalism Quarterly 30:179-88.
Dawson, Mitchell. (1948). "Law and the Right of Privacy." American Mercury
39:397.
"Developments in the Law of Defamation." (1956). Harvard Law Review
69:876-959.
Dicken Garcia, Hazel. (1989). Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth-Century
America. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Dumenil, Lynn. (1995). The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in
the 1920s. New York: Hill and Wang.
Farber, David R. and Eric Foner. (1994). The Age of Great Dreams: America in
the 1960s. New York: Hill and Wang.
Forde, Kathy Roberts. (2008). Literary Journalism on Trial: Masson v. New Yorker
and the First Amendment. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
Forer, Lois G. (1987). A Chilling Effect: The Mounting Threat of Libel and
Invasion of Privacy Actions to the First Amendment. New York: Norton.
Gajda, Amy. (2009). "Judging Journalism: The Tum Toward Privacy and
Judicial Regulation of the Press." California Law Review 97:1039-105.
Goffman, Erving. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday.
Green, Edward. (1968). "The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial
Reality." Law and Society Review 2:241-57.
Hale, Dennis. (1987). "Freedom of Expression: The Warren and Burger
Courts." Com111-unications and The Law 9:3.
Henn, Steve. (2013). ''Facebook Users Question $20 Million Settlement Over
Ads. "NPR, May 13. www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/0S/14/
182861926/facebook-users-question-20-million-settlement-over-ads.
Hofstadter, Richard. (1955). The Age of Reform: FromBryantoFDR. New York:
Vintage Books.
Hughes, Helen McGill. (1940). News and the Human Interest Story: A Study of
Popular Literature. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
Kalven, Harry. (1966). "Privacy in Tort Law -Were Brandeis and Warren
Wrong?" Law and Contemporary Problems 31:332.
Kasson, John F. (1990). Rudeness and Civility: Manners in Nineteenth-Century
Urban America. New York: Hill and Wang.
Koshetz, Herbert. (1952). "Garment Industry Has No Complaint." New York
Times, April 6.
Kyvig, David E. (2002). Daily Life in the United States, 1920-39: Decades of
Promise and Pain. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Laurent, Francis W. (1959). The Business of a Trial Court: 100 Years of Cases:
A Census of the Actions and Special Proceedings in the Circuit Court for

226

PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO ONE'S IMAGE

Chippewa County, Wisconsin, 1855-1954. Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press.
Lee, Alfred McClung. (1937). The Daily Newspaper in America: The Evolution
of a Social Instrument. New York: Macmillan Co.
Levy, Newman. (1935). "The Right to Be Let Alone." American Mercury,
June.
Magruder, Calvert. (1936). "Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts." Harvard Law Review 49:1034-67.
Marchand, Roland. (1985). Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for
Modernity, 1920-1940. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
McNeese, Tim and Richard Jensen. (2010). World War I and the Roaring
Twenties, 1914-1928. New York: Chelsea House.
Miller, Vernon X. (1960). Selected Essays on Torts. Buffalo, NY: Dennis.
Moskowitz, Eva S. (2001). In Therapy We Trust: America's Obsession with SelfFulfillment. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Nizer, Louis. (1940). "The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments."
Michigan Law Review 39:526-96.
Odgers, William Blake and Melville Madison Bigelow. (1881). A Digest of the Law

of Libel and Slander: With the Evidence, Procedure, and Practice, both in Civil
and Criminal Cases, and Precedents of Pleadings. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
"The Passion for Publicity." (1896). Outlook, April25.
Peiss, Kathy Lee. (1998). Hope in a]ar: The Making of America's Beauty Culture.
New York: Metropolitan Books.
Pells, Richard H. (1985). The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American
Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s. New York: Harper and Row.
Pember, Don R. ( 1972). Privacy and the Press: The Law, the Mass Media, and the
First Amendment. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
"The Press: Freedom to Photograph." (1954 ). Time, August 9.
Prosser, William L. (1960). "Privacy." California Law Review 48:383-423.
Ragland, George. (1928). "The Right of Privacy." Kentucky Law Journal
17:85-122.
"Restatemen t of Law Torts." (1939). Volume IV, Division 10, Chapter 41, As
Adopted by the American Law Institute. St. Paul, MN: American Law
Institute Publishers.
Riesman, David. (1950). The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American
Character. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press.
Rosenberg, Norman L. (1986). Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History
of the Law of Libel. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Sandel, Michael J. (1998). Democracy's discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1946). Learning How to Behave, A Historical Study of
American Etiquette Books. New York: Macmillan Co.

227

SAMANTHA BARBAS

Schorman, Rob. (2003 ). Selling Style: Clothing and Social Change at the Tum of
the Century. Philadelphia, PA: PENN/University of Pennsylvania Press.
Simmel, George. (1950). "The Metropolis and Mental Life." In The Sociology
of George Simmel, edited by Kurt H. Wolff. New York: The Free Press.
Smolla, Rodney A. ( 1986). Suing the Press. New York: Oxford University Press.
Strossen, Nadine. (1996). "Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court." In The
Warren Court: A Retrospective, edited by Bernard Schwartz. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Thayer, Frank. ( 1943 ). "The Changing Libel Scene." Wisconsin Law Review
1943:331-51.
Wade, John. (1962). "Defamation and Privacy." Vanderbilt Law Review
15:1093-5.
Wirth, Lewis. (1938). "Urbanism as a Way of Life." American Journal of
Sociology 4:2-24.
Yasser, Ray. (2008). "Warren Spahn's Legal Legacy: The Right to Be Free
from False Praise." Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law
18:49-84.
Young, William H. and Nancy K. Young. (2004). The 1950s. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press.
"Zbyszko v. Ape." (1930). Time Magazine, February 24.

228

